Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1995

State of Utah v. Brent Thomas Silvers : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert K. Heineman; Robert L. Steele; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorney for
Appellant.
Todd A. Utzinger; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; John N. Spikes;
Deputy District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Silvers, No. 950002 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1995).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6385

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IFAH
DOCUMENT

BRIEF

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS K F U

50

DOCKET NO. 3 '30002^2/

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 950002-CA
Priority No. 2

BRENT THOMAS SILVERS,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR TWO COUNTS OF
BURGLARY, BOTH SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202
(1995), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, PRESIDING.
TODD A. UTZINGER (6047)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
JOHN N. SPPKES (3062)
Deputy District Attorney
for Salt Lake County
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
Attorneys for Appellee
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
ROBERT L. STEELE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

FILED
JUL 2 5 1995
COURT OF APPEALS

Attorneys for Appellant
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
PUBLISHED OPINION UNWARRANTED

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 950002-CA

Priority No. 2

v.
BRENT THOMAS SILVERS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR TWO COUNTS OF
BURGLARY, BOTH SECOND DEGREE FELONIES, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202
(1995), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, PRESIDING.
TODD A. UTZINGER (6047)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
JOHN N. SPIKES (3062)
Deputy District Attorney
for Salt Lake County
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
Attorneys for Appellee
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
ROBERT L. STEELE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444
Attorneys for Appellant
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
PUBLISHED OPINION UNWARRANTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS. .

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I

A.

B.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED
THAT SERGEANT BROWN'S EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT WAS
RELIABLE AND THAT EVIDENCE OF THAT
IDENTIFICATION AS WELL AS BROWN'S
IN COURT IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT
WAS THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE
Sergeant Brown had An Excellent
Opportunity to View Defendant At The
Time of The Incident At Little
America on February 15, 1994 . „

6

8

Brown's Defenda"14-. Because The Officer
Was Trying To Observe Defendant In
Hopes Of Identifying Him Sometime
Later
,

9

Brown, An Experienced Police Officer,
Had The Capacity To Observe Defendant...

9

D.

Brown's Identification Of Defendant Was
Spontaneous and Remained Consistent. . . . 10

E.

Brown Was Investigating A Burglary In
Progress When He Observed Defendant,
Which Suggests That His Encounter With
Defendant Was An Unusual One That Brown
Would Likely Remember Accurately

CONCLUSION

12
13

i

ADDENDA
ADDENDUM A

-

Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress Eyewitness Identification
Testimony

ADDENDUM B

-

Order Denying Defendant's Motion
To Suppress Eyewitness Identification
Testimony

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Neil V. BJqqers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972)

7

State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900 (Utah App. 1994)

13

State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986)

7

State v. Perry. No. 940728-CA (Utah App. July 13, 1995) . . .

2, 6

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)

7,

...

1,

2,

6,

8,

9, 10, 11, 12
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995)

,. 1,

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1994)

1

Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 7

2

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 950002-CA

v.

:

Priority No- 2

BRENT THOMAS SILVERS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of
burglary, both second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the
eyewitness identification of defendant by Sergeant William Brown
of the Salt Lake City Police Department was reliable and hence
admissible at defendant's trial.
A trial court's decision to admit evidence of an
eyewitness identification and to allow an eyewitness to make an
identification during trial is a question of law that is reviewed
for correctness.
1991).

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781

(Utah

However, the standard for determining whether an

eyewitness identification is sufficiently reliable to render it

admissible conveys a measure of discretion to the trial court,
and the trial court's findings of fact underlying its reliability
determination will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.

Id.

at 781 n.3. Accord State v. Perry, No. 940728-CA, Slip. Op. at
5-6 (Utah App. July 13, 1995).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Const, art* I, sec. 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of burglary, both
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1995), and two counts of theft, both class B misdemeanors, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 6-8) .
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of
his identification at a -showup by Sergeant William Brown of the
Salt Lake City Police Department as well as his in court
identification by Brown on the ground that the showup was unduly
suggestive and that Brown's identification of defendant was
therefore unreliable (R. 32). Following a hearing, the trial
court entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law
(R. 126-129) .

(A copy of the trial court's findings of fact and

conclusion of law is attached hereto as addendum A.)

Based on

its findings of facts, the trial court denied defendant's motion
to suppress (R. 130).

(A copy of the trial court's order denying

defendant's motion to suppress is attached hereto as addendum B.)
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as
2

charged in the information (R. 117-118).

Defendant filed a

motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict in which
he asked that the two theft charges be dismissed on the grounds
that the State had failed to establish the value of the property
underlying defendant's theft convictions (R. 131-132).

The trial

court granted defendant's motion (R. 155), and it sentenced
defendant to two concurrent terms of one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison (R. 156-157).

Defendant appeals from that

judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Sergeant William Brown, a 23 year veteran of the Salt
Lake City Police Department, was working as a security officer at
the Little America Hotel on the night of February 15, 1994 (R.
173-74).

While walking the grounds of the hotel with a

maintenance worker at about 7:30 in the evening, Brown noticed a
"white small car that looked like a Subaru Justy parked in the
loading dock area" (R. 174, 176) . Brown did riot consider the
vehicle's presence particularly unusual because people often
parked there to offload equipment or pick up hotel employees (R.
175).

As he walked toward the car, he looked beyond it and saw

"one of [the hotel's] console TVs sitting out on the lawn" behind
the car (R. 175). Brown knew that other hotel televisions had
been stolen in recent burglaries in which sliding glass doors on
the outer lodges had been pried open so that the televisions
could be removed (R. 174).
Although Brown did not initially see the driver of the
3

car, when he noticed that it was backed up and in "very close
proximity to the television set, [he] ran to the driver's side of
the vehicle and took a look at the driver" (R. 176). At about
the same time, the white car started to leave the loading dock
area and drove right in front of Brown (R. 175)•
Brown noticed that one of the front fenders of the
otherwise white car was yellow in color and that the hatchback
window and side windows were tinted all the way around the car
and may have been covered with black tape (R. 176-77).

Brown

also recorded the license plate number of the vehicle and
reported it to dispatch (R. 178).
Brown got a "clear look" at the driver (R. 178).
Specifically, Brown had an unobstructed view of the driver's face
in profile for approximately five seconds (R. 177), and the
loading dock area was well-lighted (R. 176). There were also
city street lights nearby (R. 176). Brown described the driver
as a white adult male with "blondish-brown hair, over the collar"
and wearing a white pullover sweater or sweat shirt (R. 177).
Approximately two weeks later, Brown was contacted by
Detective Gil Arnaz and asked to view a photo array consisting of
several individuals who were similar in appearance and that
matched his description-of the driver (R. 178-79),

Brown

selected a photograph of defendant from the array and identified
him as the driver of the white car (R. 179, 304-05).

Although

Brown testified that he was not "one hundred percent sure" of his
identification of defendant, he indicated that he was so certain
4

that he would have arrested defendant based on his identification
of him (R. 179).
The day after he viewed the photo array, March 5, 1994,
Brown was on duty for the Salt Lake City Police (R. 180)• That
evening, Brown heard dispatch report that there was a burglary in
progress at Little America (R. 180, 188). Brown used his radio
to tell officers responding to the call to look for a white
Subaru hatchback with tinted windows (R. 180). Brown then drove
to Little America because he wanted to look for the car he had
seen on February 15, 1994 and because he was the "second sergeant
for that area" (R. 180).
Upon arriving .at Little America, Brown saw the same
white car he had seen at the hotel two weeks earlier (R. 181).
Acting on his own initiative and without first speaking to any of
the officers on the scene, Brown looked at an individual that was
handcuffed and sitting in the back of a patrol car.

Brown

immediately recognized that the person was uncjer arrest and that
he was in fact the person who had been driving the white car on
February 15, 1994 (R. 181-83, 199-201, 209),
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's decision to admit evidence of
Sergeant Brown's eyewitness identification of defendant should be
upheld.

Brown had a good opportunity to observe defendant, and

he was focused on looking at defendant in hopes of identifying
him at a later date. Nothing in the record suggests that Brown's
ability to see defendant was impaired, and Brown's subsequent
5

identification of defendant two weeks later at another crime
scene was spontaneous.

Finally, although defendant was

handcuffed and in the back of a police car when Brown identified
him, the circumstances as a whole demonstrate that Brown's
identification of defendant was reliable and untainted by
suggestiveness.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
SERGEANT BROWN'S EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION OF
DEFENDANT WAS RELIABLE AND THAT EVIDENCE OF
THAT IDENTIFICATION AS WELL AS BROWN'S IN
COURT IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT WAS
THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE
The trial court's decision to admit eyewitness
identification at defendant's trial was correct.

On appeal,

defendant does not attack any of the trial court's findings of
fact.

Rather, he attacks only the trial court's ultimate

determination that Brown's identification of defendant was
reliable under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Though a conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness, the
trial court's determination on this issue is entitled to some
deference because the reliability standard itself conveys to the
trial court a measure of discretion.

State v. Perry, No. 940728-

CA, Slip. Op. at 5-6 (Utah App. July 13, 1995).

As demonstrated

below, the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting
evidence of Brown's identification of defendant.
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah
Supreme Court articulated a "reliability" standard for
6

determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification
testimony in criminal cases under article I, section 7 of the
Utah Constitution.

In so doing, the Court expressly departed

from the federal "undue suggestiveness" test called for under
Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 188# 198-99, 93 S. Ct. 375, 381-82
(1972).

Recognizing that the Ramirez reliability standard

"meet[s] or exceed[s] the rigor of the federal standard [,]"
defendant has elected to proceed solely under the Utah
Constitution.

Br. of Appellant at 6 n.4. Brown's identification

of defendant easily passes constitutional muster under Ramirez.
Ramirez requires trial courts to consider the "totality
of the circumstances" surrounding an eyewitness identification
and determine its reliability based on the following factors:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's
degree of attention to the actor at the time
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to
observe the event, including his or her
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the
witness's identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event
being observed and the likelihood that the
witness would perceive, remember and relate
it correctly. This last area includes such
factors as whether the event was an ordinary
one in the mind of the observer during the
time it was observed, and whether the race of
the actor was the same as the observer's.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483,
493 (Utah 1986)) .
Based on the factors outlined above, the facts of this
case support the trial court's finding of reliability.
7

A.

Sergeant Brown Had An Excellent
Opportunity To View Defendant At The
Time Of The Incident At Little America
On February 15, 1994.

The first factor to consider in determining the
reliability of Brown's identification of defendant is the
opportunity Brown had to view defendant on February 15, 1994.
Brown's attention focused on defendant's vehicle after he noticed
a television set on the lawn outside a room at the Little America
Hotel.

Upon seeing the television and defendant's car starting

to leave the area, Brown ran toward defendant's car to look at
the driver.

He had an unobstructed view of defendant face in

profile for approximately five seconds at a distance of about
five feet away.

Although it was nighttime, the area was well lit

by lights surrounding the Little America loading dock as well as
city lights along Main Street (R. 127). Nothing in the record
suggests that there were distracting noises or activity.

On the

contrary, the evidence shows that, with the exception of the
maintenance worker who was walking with Brown,'' the area was
deserted and quiet until defendant started his car engine.

Under

the circumstances, Brown had a good opportunity to view
defendant.

Cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782 (identification deemed

reliable where witness viewed the defendant, who was wearing a
scarf to mask the lower portion of his face and was crouched in a
shadowy area, for a "few seconds" to a "minute" at a distance of
approximately ten feet and witness's view of the defendant was
sometimes obstructed by defendant's accomplice).

6

B.

Brown's Attention Was Focused On
Defendant Because The Officer Was Trying
To Observe Defendant In Hopes
Identifying Him Sometime Later.

The second reliability factor is Brown's degree of
attention to defendant.

In this case, Brown's attention was

heightened upon his discovery of the television console on the
lawn outside of a hotel room.

He knew that other television sets

had been stolen from ground level rooms in recent weeks and that
a car was parked at the nearby loading dock (R. 126). He
immediately refocused his attention on the nearby car when its
engine started.

He ran toward the car and, as defendant

concedes, "was attentive and actively focused on making an
accurate identification" of the car's driver.

Br. of Appellant

at 7. As defendant recognizes, the second factor weighs in favor
of a finding of reliability.

Cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783

(witness was fully aware that a robbery was in progress and
testified that he "stared at the gunman" so that he would be able
to provide a "good description" of him to police).
C.

Brown, An Experienced Police Officer,
Had The Capacity To Observe Defendant.

The third reliability factor is whether Brown had the
capacity to observe defendant when defendant drove by him outside
the outside the hotel on February 15, 1994. Nothing in the
record suggests that Brown had any physical or mental impairment
that may have interfered with his capacity to observe defendant.
Nor does the record suggest that Brown was fatigued, injured or
otherwise impaired.

On the contrary, the record shows that Brown
9

reacted quickly upon seeing the television by refocusing his
attention on the nearby car and running toward it as soon as he
heard its engine start. As an experienced police officer, Brown
obviously recognized the importance of getting a good look at the
driver of the car and did everything possible to enhance his
ability to make an accurate identification of defendant. Cf.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (identification upheld where witness was
struck in the stomach with a pipe during a struggle with the
defendant's accomplice and was then threatened with a pistol).
D.

Brown's Identification Of Defendant Was
Spontaneous And Remained Consistent.

The fourth reliability factor is whether Brown's
identification was made "spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter or whether it was a product of suggestion.

Relevant

circumstance to considered when evaluating this factor include
the length of time that passed between the incident and the
identification of defendant, the witness's state of mind at the
time of the incident, the witness's exposure to other information
from other sources, and the conditions under which defendant was
presented to the witness for identification.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d

at 783.
Brown selected defendant's photograph from a photo
array consisting of several pictures two weeks after the February
15 incident at Little America (R. 127). Although Brown testified
that he was not one hundred percent certain the photograph of
defendant he selected was of the person he had seen driving the
car past him at the hotel, he indicated that he was certain
10

enough that he would have arrested defendant.

The next night,

Brown was on duty for the Salt Lake City Police when he heard a
report of a burglary in progress at Little America.

He provided

other officers a detailed description of defendant and
defendant's car over the radio and proceeded to Little America
(R. 127). Upon his arrival at Little America, Brown walked up to
a police car and saw defendant in handcuffs in the back seat. He
then told Officer Whiting that defendant was the person he hadseen at the hotel two weeks earlier (R. 128).
While the fact that defendant was in custody at the
time Brown identified him would normally weigh against the State,
the trial court recognized that Brown went to Little America and
identified defendant on his own initiative.

Brown was neither

instructed to go to the hotel by another officer nor directed to
the car in which defendant was being held in hopes of having him
identify defendant.

Indeed, Brown's first words to other

officers at the hotel were "that's the guy" referring to
defendant.

As such, Brown's identification of defendant is best

characterized as spontaneous and consistent with his earlier
selection of defendant's photograph from an array, the propriety
of which defendant has never challenged.

Considering the

totality of the circumstances, the forth reliability factor
points toward a finding of reliability.

Cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at

783-84 (witness identified defendant no more than hour after
being robbed and was likely suffering from the "normal agitation
that would result from being robbed!,]" and his description of
11

the defendant varied slightly over time and descriptions received
from all witnesses were "somewhat confused").
E.

Brown Was Investigating A Burglary In
Progress When He Observed Defendant,
Which Suggests That His Encounter With
Defendant Was An Unusual One That Brown
Would Likely Remember Accurately.

The last reliability factor to consider under Ramirez
is the nature of the event observed by Brown and the likelihood
that he would perceive and remember it accurately.

Brown was a

trained police officer investigating a burglary in progress.
Clearly, his attention was heightened under the circumstances as
evidenced by his testimony about how he ran toward defendant's
vehicle in an effort to look at him.

Brown provided a detailed

and accurate description of defendant's vehicle, including the
fact that the rear windows had been tinted dark or covered with
tape.

He also recorded the license plate number of defendant's

vehicle and noted that the white car had sustained some damage
and that the color of the repaired area did nqt match the rest of
the car.

Most importantly, Brown provided what proved to be an

accurate description of 'defendant.

In sum, Brown immediately

recognized that a crime was underway and strived to make detailed
observations of defendant and defendant's car.

Cf. Ramirez, 817

P.2d at 783-84 (witness knew he and his companions were being
robbed and concentrated on obtaining descriptions of their
assailants).
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the
trial court's decision to admit Brown's eyewitness identification
12

evidence was correct and should therefore be upheld.1
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should uphold the
trial court's decision to admit evidence of .Sergeant Brown's
identification of defendant and affirm defendant's conviction.
STATEMENT REGARDING NEED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND
DESIRABILITY OF A PUBLISHED OPINION
The facts of this case are undisputed, and the issue on
appeal has been adequately briefed by both parties. Accordingly,
the State does not believe oral argument will materially assist
this Court in its deliberations.
Regardless of its outcome, defendant's appeal will
break no new legal ground in Utah.

Disposition of this appeal by

issuance of a fully articulated, published opinion is therefore
unwarranted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ V ^ d a y of July, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

TODD A. UTMNGpR
Assistant Attorney General

1

Defendant makes a* passing reference to the notion that
there were no exigent circumstances to justify Brown's use of a
showup instead of a lineup to identify defendant. Br. of
Appellant at 9. Exigent circumstances is not a consideration
under Ramirez, and defendant failed to raise this argument below.
This Court should therefore refuse to consider it on appeal. See
State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 903 (Utah App. 1994) (absent a
showing of plain error or exceptional circumstances, appellate
courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal).
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ADDENDA

Addendum A
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
On Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Eyewitness Identification Testimony

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JOHN N. SPIKES, Bar No. 3062
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

SEP 2 6 1994

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)
v

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

)

CaseNo.941900704FS

'

Hon. J. Dennis Frederick

-vsBRENT THOMAS SILVERS,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, Third District Court Judge, on August 9, 1994. The plaintiff was represented by its
attorney, John N. Spikes, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, and the defendant was present and
represented by his attorney, Robert L. Steele.

The Court having heard the evidence and

argument presented by the parties, now makes and enters the following:
FINDINGS QF FACT
On February 15,1994, while working as a security guard at Little America, located at 534
South Main, Salt Lake City, Sergeant Brown, a 23-year veteran of the Salt Lake City Police
Department, at approximately 7:15 to 7:30 PM, observed a white, older model Subaru parked in
the loading dock driveway at Little America. The officer was aware of a history of burglaries
and thefts from ground level apartments of both televisions and television remote controls.
2. Brown, at the time of seeing the Subaru, simultaneously saw a television console
sitting outside a ground level apartment. The Subaru was backed up to the television. The
Subaru had blacked-out windows by the use oft pe and an unusual color.
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CaseNo.941900704FS
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3. While going to inspect the circumstances, a white male driver with long, shoulderlength hair drove past the officer, leaving rapidly. The officer obtained a view of the individual
within approximately five feet of a well-lighted area.
4. Approximately two weeks later, Brown saw a photo spread of individuals and selected
one he thought to be the defendant, but he was not one hundred percent sure.
5. Then on March 5th of 1994, while on duty with the Salt Lake City Police Department,
Officer Brown heard a radio report of a potential burglary in progress at Little America. Upon
hearing that report, Brown announced over the radio a description of the Subaru he had seen on
February 15,1994, which was heard by Officer Whiting.
6. Whiting responded on March 5th, 1994, to Little America, where he observed a
television moved onto the balcony of a ground-level apartment through jimmied doors and
obtained a description of the suspect from the on-duty security guard.
7. Whiting saw the described vehicle parked across the street from the burglarized
apartment. He checked over the radio its registration and found it wa£ registered to the
defendant. He thereafter, over the radio, obtained a description of the defendant from the driver's
license information. Whiting observed the vehicle which fit the description of the suspect
vehicle which he had heard over the air and he observed it was modified for hauling loads. The
description that he observed on the vehicle was that previously given by Brown over the air.
Whiting waited in the area and subsequently spotted the defendant at a public pay phone near the
area of the burglary, looking nervous, making furtive movements and looking like he was not
really talking on the phone.
8. The suspect matched the description that Whiting had obtained from the driver's
license bureau. Officer Whiting approached the defendant, asked what he was doing, and asked
for his name. The defendant gave a false name. The officer then asked for identification and was
given the defendant's driver's license which identified him as the owner of the suspect vehicle.
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9. When asked if he owned the suspect car, the defendant replied yes and stated he had
parked it near the station to use the pay phone. Whiting determined at that point he had probable
cause to make the arrest and did so.
10. He did not Mirandize the defendant.
11. Sergeant Brown subsequently arrived at the scene and on his own volition IDfd the
defendant as the same suspect in the February 15,1994, incident. Wahlin overheard some
comments of the defendant, but thought that these comments were made after the defendant was
under arrest.
WHEREFORE, having herefore entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The identification of the defendant by Whiting was not tainted or suggestive. Brown
just relaying, as a good officer should, the information he had with regard to the previous
burglary and the vehicle description, was acting in a reasonable fashion.
2. The statements made by the defendant prior to the arrest are not suppressable. The
defendant responded to preliminary investigatory questions of Whiting, which Whiting was
authorized to ask in attempting to determined if the defendant was connected with the crime,
pursuant to 77-8-1 of the Utah Code.
3. However, any statements made by the defendant post arrest, before the defendant was
Mirandized, if there are any such statements, are excludable.
4. Officer Whiting established articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion to
believe the defendant was the suspect and his questions of the defendant prior to the arrest were
in furtherance of that effort to determine if the defendant was the owner of the described suspect
vehicle pursuant to Title 77-7-15.
5. Any statements made to Detective Arnaz declining to discuss matters further are
suppressed.
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6. Any statements made by the defendant post arrest, prior to being Mirandized, are
likewise excludable and to be suppressed.
7. There was nothing unduly suggestive or inappropriate about Officer Brown's
identification of the defendant.
DATED this 26th day of September, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

ROBERT L.STEELE
Legal Defenders Association

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Robert Steele,
at the office of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, Salt Lake City UT 84111, this
day of September, 1994.
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DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
JOHN N. SPIKES, Bar No. 3062
Deputy County Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

SEP 2 6 1994

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

-vs-

CaseNo.941900704FS
BRENT THOMAS SILVERS,
Hon. J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.

Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
DATED this 26th day of September, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

E l . DENNIS FREDERI
strict Qourt
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Robert
at the office of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, Salt Lake City UT 84111, this
day of September, 1994.

00130

